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I. INTRODUCTION

A long-standing pillar of federal court litigation is the final judgment
rule, currently codified in § 1291 of the Judicial Code.1 It provides for one
appeal as of right from rulings of district courts, but states that only “final
orders” at the trial level may be appealed.2 This means that interlocutory,
* Donald P. Klekamp Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. This article was
prepared for a symposium on Federal Appellate Procedure at the University of Akron Law School in
April 2020. Thanks to Bryan Lammon, Bob Martineau, David Skidmore, and Joan Steinman for
helpful comments on an earlier draft; to Joe Cecil for guidance on accessing data on litigation
involving 28 U.S.C. 1292(b) in federal court; and to Alisher Kassym for research assistance.
© Copyright 2020 by Michael E. Solimine.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2018).
2. Like most courts and commentators, I use “final order” and “final judgment”
interchangeably. Interpreting § 1291, the Supreme Court has stated that a “final order” is a decision
which “terminate[s the] action,” or “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court
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non-final decisions cannot be immediately appealed. Those decisions can
be appealed by the losing party as part of an appeal from a final judgment.
The reasons for the rule are well-settled. Permitting unhappy litigants
to immediately appeal any and all interlocutory decisions would cause
havoc with the orderly administration of trial litigation and potentially
flood appellate courts with cases. Such a regime would show little
deference to decisions of trial courts and could lead to wasteful litigation
and decisions at the appellate level, since interlocutory decisions may be
mooted out in favor of the unhappy party (i.e., that party may win, or lose,
the case anyway on other grounds). Similarly settled is the necessity for
some exceptions to the final judgment rule. Consider that an interlocutory
decision may be mooted by subsequent events (e.g., the denial of a motion
for an injunction), cause unnecessary litigation until reversed on appeal
(e.g., the erroneous denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction),
or improperly prevent a case from being litigated at all (e.g., the erroneous
denial of class action certification that is the “death knell” of the
litigation).
To ameliorate the harshness of the final judgment rule, Congress and
the courts have developed exceptions, a full accounting of which is
beyond the scope of this Article.3 Instead, I will focus on two of the
exceptions: permissive interlocutory appeals, codified in § 1292(b) of the
Judicial Code;4 and the collateral order doctrine. As discussed in Part II
of this Article, § 1292(b) permits immediate appeals in civil cases under
certain criteria, and as I have argued before, for a number of reasons is a
relatively well-crafted exception, not least of which in that it requires the
permission of both the district court and the appellate court.5 In my view
this is no less true today, 30 years later. Moreover, § 1292(b) could and
should have been used in at least two recent, high-profile cases to
immediately review controversial interlocutory district court decisions.

to do but execute the judgment.” Ritzen Grp., Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, 140 S. Ct. 582, 586
(2020) (quoting Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 574 U.S. 405, 409 (2015)).
3. Other exceptions include immediate appeals of the grant or denials of motions for an
injunction (28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (2018)); of orders only affecting one issue out of many, or one party
in a multiple party case (FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b)); of class certification decisions (FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f));
and writs of mandamus. For useful summaries and discussion of these and other exceptions, see Bryan
Lammon, Rules, Standards, and Experimentation in Appellate Jurisdiction, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 423
(2013); Robert J. Martineau, Defining Finality and Appealability by Court Rule: Right Problem,
Wrong Solution, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 717, 729–48 (1993).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2018).
5. Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts, 58 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1165, 1175–83 (1990) (advocating greater use of interlocutory appeals in some
contexts, particularly those involving § 1292(b)).
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Part III of the Article addresses the collateral order doctrine. This
exception has been controversial almost from its inception, both for its
dubious provenance (ostensibly an interpretation of the final judgment
statute) and, more importantly, the difficulties in applying the doctrine in
a principled and coherent fashion. Those issues have been extensively
addressed before,6 but what is worthy of further attention is the linkage of
the doctrine to § 1292(b) appeals. The institutional standing of the
doctrine is on uncertain grounds given the very existence of § 1292(b),
enacted in 1958, and statues passed in 1990 and 1992 which permit
rulemaking by the courts to create exceptions to the final judgment rule.
True, the Supreme Court has ameliorated the problems of the doctrine by
(mostly) narrowly construing it, but at the same time the Court has
frequently pointed to § 1292(b) appeals as a more appropriate exception.
Courts should take that advice seriously by applying § 1292(b), when
appropriate, more often and, likewise, continue to narrowly interpret the
collateral order doctrine or, better yet, do away with it entirely.
II. APPLYING (AND REVIVING) PERMISSIVE INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS
This Part of the Article discusses the passage of, and controversies
associated with the application of interlocutory appeals under,
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); the application of this provision in recent,
controversial appellate litigation; and how courts should apply § 1292(b)
going forward.
A.

Background and Application of § 1292(b)

Some version of the final judgment rule has statutorily existed since
the beginning of the federal court system.7 The Supreme Court has
frequently extolled the virtues of the rule. In one recent formulation, it
said that while a “party is entitled to a single appeal, to be deferred until
final judgment has been entered, . . . [p]ermitting piecemeal, prejudgment
appeals . . . undermines ‘efficient judicial administration’ and encroaches
upon the prerogatives of district court judges, who play a ‘special role’ in
managing ongoing litigation.”8 The “justification for immediate appeal,”
the Court continued, “must therefore be sufficiently strong to overcome
the usual benefits of deferring appeal until litigation conclude[d].”9

6.
7.
8.
9.

See infra Part III(B).
Martineau, supra note 3, at 726–29.
Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009) (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 107.
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Consequently, it is not surprising that since the birth of the final
judgment rule, Congress and federal courts have established mechanisms
for exceptions to the rule. One of those exceptions is the Interlocutory
Appeals Act, passed in 195810 and codified in § 1292(b) of the Judicial
Code.11 As contemporaneously observed by Charles Alan Wright, the
provision “represents a middle view between those who opposed any
broadening of interlocutory review and those who favored giving the
appellate courts discretion to entertain any interlocutory appeal they
wished regardless of certification by the trial judge.”12
The middle ground is expressed in several ways, most notably with
the requirement of dual certification of an immediate appeal by both the
district judge and the court of appeals. And not simply any issue can be
certified; both levels of courts must find that several criteria must be
satisfied: there must be a “controlling issue of law,” upon which there is
a “substantial ground for difference of opinion,” such that an immediate
appeal “may materially advance the termination of the litigation.”13 The
drafters intended to open a narrow exception to the final judgment rule, to
be used in only “exceptional cases where a decision of the appeal may
avoid protracted and expensive litigation . . . where a question which
would be dispositive of the litigation is raised and there is serious doubt
as to how it should be decided. . . .”14
In the six decades since its passage, courts have continued to debate
the contours of these criteria. A full description of that debate is
unnecessary here. Suffice it to say that lower courts continue to tangle
over the precise meaning of the elements of § 1292(b). Thus, it is not clear
how “controlling” an issue of law must be, that is, whether a reversal of
the district court decision would necessarily lead to a final judgment for

10. Pub. L. No. 85-919, 72 Stat. 17770 (1958).
11. “When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under
this section, shall be of the opinion that such an order involves a controlling issue of law as to which
there is a substantial grounds for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order
may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such
order. The Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such
order, if application is made to it within ten days after entry of the order: Provided, however, That an
application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district
judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2018) (emphasis
in original).
12. Charles Allan Wright, The Interlocutory Appeals Act of 1958, 23 F.R.D. 199, 202 (1959)
(footnote omitted). For further discussions of the legislative history, see Solimine, supra note 5, at
1171–72; Note, Interlocutory Appeals In the Federal Courts Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), 88 HARV.
L. REV. 607, 610–12 (1975).
13. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2018).
14. Wright, supra note 12, at 204 (quoting the legislative history).
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the appealing party.15 Some authorities suggest that a reversal can be
considered to have met this language, even if it would not in inexorably
lead to a reversal of a final judgment against the appealing party, “if
interlocutory reversal might save time for the district court, and time and
expense for the litigants.”16 Similarly, some courts have been unclear
about how to interpret a question of law in this context, as presumably
opposed to one of fact, or an issue typically left to district court
discretion.17
Nor has it been clear how to determine if there is a “substantial
ground for a difference of opinion,” or if an immediate appeal will
“materially advance the termination of the litigation.” Many courts, not
surprisingly or inappropriately, appear to assume that the statutory criteria
should be applied in an interrelated fashion, so that if there is a controlling
issue of law, an immediate appeal will likely advance the termination of
the litigation.18
The most contentious issue regarding the interpretation of § 1292(b)
has been the assertion that its use should be restricted to “exceptional” or
“big” cases. Such a restriction has some basis in the legislative history, as
already noted,19 as well as the common sense notion that if § 1292(b) is
interpreted too broadly, it could generate too many appeals. But the
restriction finds no basis in the legislative text, and properly understood
the legislative history is simply referring to cases that, all things being
equal, are more likely to satisfy the statutory criteria.20
Nonetheless, these differing interpretations have persisted, in part,
because the Supreme Court has frequently and favorably cited § 1292(b)
as an option for litigants seeking interlocutory review, albeit in dicta and
with relatively little discussion of the proper interpretation or application

15. Solimine, supra note 5, at 1172.
16. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3930, at 426 (2d
ed. 1996) (footnote omitted).
17. Id. at 427–29.
18. Id. at 432–38; Solimine, supra note 5, at 1173 n.50.
19. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
20. WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 3929 at 365–70 (arguing against “exceptional” case requirement
on textual grounds and noting that many courts do not follow it); Solimine, supra note 5, at 1173,
1193–95 (summarizing the dispute and arguing against a strict “big case” requirement). In referencing
the legislative history of § 1292(b) and other laws in this Article, I am aware of contemporary norms
of legislative interpretation that give the primary if not exclusive role to the text of the statute. I have
previously argued that my views of the proper interpretation of § 1292(b) do not depend on what
interpretative role, if any, one gives to legislative history in addition to the text. Solimine, supra note
5, at 1193–94 n.152. I stand by this conclusion and extend it to the 1990 and 1992 laws discussed
later in this Article.
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of the criteria.21 (I shall have more to say below about the jurisprudential
significance of these references for the scope of the collateral order
doctrine.) Despite this lack of guidance, by and large the lower courts
appear to be interpreting and applying § 1292(b) in a measured and useful
way. The late Charles Alan Wright and his co-authors have persuasively
argued that while § 1292(b) is designed “for the purpose of minimizing
the total burdens of litigation on parties and the judicial system by
accelerating or at least simplifying trial court proceedings,” it “might
serve the additional purposes of avoiding that hardship does not result
from the length of the proceedings alone, or of providing a vehicle for
appellate review of issues that characteristically evade review on appeal
from a final judgment.”22 They continue: “[T]he flexible procedures of
§ 1292(b) would offer many advantages over the often contorted finality
doctrines that courts have found useful or even necessary[,]” and that
“[l]iteralistic interpretation of the [statutory criteria] should not stand in
the way.”23

21. See, e.g., Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 574 U.S. 405, 416 (2015); Mohawk Indus., Inc.
v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 110–11 (2009); Swint v. Chambers Cty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 46–47
(1995); Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 883 (1994); Gulfstream Aerospace
Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 288 (1988); Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517,
529–30 (1988); Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Kollar, 472 U.S. 424, 435 (1985); Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 378 n.13 (1981); Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 474–75
(1978). See also Cunningham v. Hamilton Cty., 527 U.S. 198, 210 (1999) (referring to interlocutory
appeal options found in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)–(c)). But see Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 74
(1996) (asserting that “[r]outine resort to § 1292(b) requests would hardly comport with Congress’
design to reserve interlocutory review for ‘exceptional’ cases while generally retaining for the federal
courts a firm final judgment rule.”) (quoting Coppers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 475 (1978)
(quoting Fisons, Ltd. v. United States, 458 F.2d 1241, 1248 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
1041 (Apr. 3,1972)).
22. WRIGHT, supra note 16, at 439 (footnotes omitted).
23. Id. at 441. This pragmatic approach is arguably illustrated by two influential decisions by
Judge Richard Posner. In Ahrenholz v. Bd. of Trustees, 219 F.3d 674 (7th Cir. 2000), a district judge
had denied a defendant’s motion for summary judgment in an employment discrimination case on the
ground that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case of retaliation. But without explanation, the
district judge certified a § 1292(b) appeal. Id. at 676. Judge Posner found that the statutory criteria
had not been satisfied. Conceding that those criteria “unfortunately, are not as crystalline as they
might be,” the statute, he held, “was not intended to make denials of summary judgment routinely
appealable,” in part because “to decide whether summary judgment was properly granted requires
hunting through the record” assembled in support of and opposing the motion. Id. at 676–77. That
would be at variance with the statute’s limit to issues of law. Contrast Ahrenholz with In re Text
Messaging Antitrust Litigation, 630 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 2010). There the appellate court, again by
Posner, held that a denial of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss in an antitrust case did satisfy the
§ 1292(b) criteria. The appeal did not seek the review or overturning of findings of fact, but rather
presented a controlling issue of law (even though a reversal was not certain to end the case, id. at
624), namely the sufficiency of pleadings in light of the Supreme Court’s then-relatively recent
decision of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). Ahrenholz was distinguished on the
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Almost 30 years ago I advanced similar views, arguing that a broader
reading of the statute was compatible with the statutory text and
legislative history. It would also be appropriate in light of the dual
certification requirement (which means two levels of courts have
presumably considered but rejected the usual disruptive effects of
interlocutory appeals), could lead to more settlements (by making the law
clearer in a particular case) and expose the courts of appeals to a richer
diet of issues (including those often subsumed in a final judgment), which
could systematically inure to the benefit of district and appellate judges,
and litigants.24 Even when the appellate court affirms the decision, that
does not show that an immediate appeal was unnecessary, because it will
likely clarify a legal issue for that case, and other similar cases.25 A
broader use of § 1292(b) is also supported by a recognition of fewer cases
going to trial in the federal system (and fewer appeals from trials), with
the concomitant rise in the importance of pretrial rulings, especially
(though not only) those potentially dispositive of the case.26
Taken as a whole, both district courts and courts of appeals appear to
be applying § 1292(b) in a measured fashion, and it has neither fallen into
disuse nor carved out a significant exception to the final judgment rule.
The Administrative Office (AO) of the U.S. Courts collects some data on
the use of § 1292(b), but has not publicly reported that data for several
basis that the case did not involve “hunting through a record,” and this case did present the thenunsettled issue of how to apply Twombly, especially in antitrust cases. Id. at 626.
24. See Solimine, supra note 5, at 1179–83. As Professor Wright notes, WRIGHT, supra note
16, at 439 n.49, a narrower view of the statute, than that favored by Wright or myself, is advanced in
Note, supra note 12, at 609, which would limit the its application “to vindicate only . . . the avoidance
of unnecessary trial proceedings.” Id. This focus would exclude the additional goals of “providing an
opportunity to review orders of the trial court before they irreparably modify the rights of the
litigants,” or to supervise “the development of the law by providing a mechanism for resolving
conflicts among trial courts on issues not normally open on final appeal.” Id. (footnotes omitted). The
Note argues, among other things, that the examples given in the legislature history are more supportive
of a narrower application of the statute. Id. at 611–12. In a recent decision acknowledging the
existence and relevance of § 1292(b), albeit without directly discussing its application, the Supreme
Court somewhat incongruously added a “see generally” cite to both my article, Solimine, supra note
5, and the Note, supra note 12. Gelboim, 574 U.S. 405, 416. Professor Wright and his treatise coauthors are not cited, though they argue for a flexible approach to interpreting the statute, see WRIGHT,
supra note 16, § 3939 at 370. It would be inappropriate to glean any strong view about the differing
approaches to § 1292(b) from these spare citations.
25. See Solimine, supra note 5, at 1198.
26. See Adam N. Steinman, Reinventing Appellate Jurisdiction, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1237, 1240–
41 (2007). See also Pauline Kim, et al., How Should We Study District Judge Decision-Making?, 29
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 83, 92 (2009) (pointing out that “a substantial portion of the district judge’s
work” are various pretrial rulings that “are usually not final decisions and therefore are only rarely
reviewed by courts of appeals.”) (footnote omitted); John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil
Trial in the United States, 122 YALE L.J. 522, 524 (2012) (stating that in recent years only about 1%
of cases go to trial in the federal courts).
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decades.27 Three decades ago I accessed data from the AO, and it showed
an average of about 280 certifications from the district courts during a
five-year period. And of those, about 100 or 36% were accepted on
average each year by the courts of appeals.28
To determine if the use of § 1292(b) had changed over two decades
later, I again accessed data from the AO for the years 2015 to 2019
regarding the number and disposition of § 1292(b) appeals accepted by
the circuit courts.29 The relevant data is collected in the Appendix to this
Article. As the Appendix indicates, the data for recent years is remarkably
similar to the previous period.30 For each year, the number of terminations
on the merits of cases that come up via § 1292(b) for all of the circuits
ranged from 106 to 80, with a yearly average of 93.2. Indeed, the number
of such appeals resulting in decisions on the merits in the circuit courts
was slightly below the analogous figures some thirty years ago.
Complimentary data has recently been reported by researchers at the
Federal Judicial Center.31 They accessed data from the AO from October
1, 2013, through June 30, 2019, and found that 636 applications under §

27. WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 3929 at 363.
28. Solimine, supra note 5, at 1176 (reporting data by circuit from 1985 to 1989). Certification
by the courts of appeals was over 50% in the 1960s, id. at 1174, and the lower rate years later might
be attributable to concerns over higher caseloads.
29. I am grateful to Gary Yakimov, Chief Data Officer, Judiciary Data & Analysis Office,
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, and his colleagues for supplying me with this data,
since it is not reported in this detail in the AO’s Annual Report. See e-mail from Gary Yakimov, Chief
Data Officer, Judiciary Data & Analysis Office, Administrative Office of the United States Courts to
author (August 26, 2019, 4:35 PM) (on file with author). Mr. Yakimov and his colleagues do not
necessarily share any of my analysis of the data. The AO’s Annual Report reports data on the
termination of all interlocutory appeals in the circuits (i.e., under § 1292(b), FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f), and
various other proceedings), see ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl. 2.7 (2018), but does not further provide the detail on § 1292(b)
reported in the Appendix.
30. The data reflects the terminations on the merits of accepted § 1292(b) appeals on a yearly
basis, as of June 30 on the five years in question, for all circuits except the Federal Circuit.
Unfortunately, the recent data does not include information on how many applications for certification
from district courts were filed in the circuit courts during the years in question, and per the dual
certification requirement accepted by the appellate court. As of 2010, these applications were treated
and counted in as appeals and were not separately accounted for. See e-mail from Tiffanie Snyder,
Appellate, BAP and Judges Program Manager, Department of Program Services, Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts, to Michael E. Solimine (Aug. 28, 2019, 3:24 PM) (citing Memorandum on
New Statistical Reporting Requirements for Courts of Appeals and Bankruptcy Appellate Panels from
Steven R. Schlesinger, Chief Statistics Division, Administrative Office of the United States Courts to
Clerks, United States Courts of Appeals and Bankruptcy Appellate Panels (Sept. 20, 2011)) (e-mail
and memorandum on file with author).
31. EMERY G. LEE III, JASON A. CATONE & KRISTIN A. GARRI, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,
PERMISSIVE INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS, 2013-2019 (2020).
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1292(b) were terminated in the Courts of Appeals during that period.32 Of
those, 101 were terminated on procedural grounds, and of the reminder,
52% were granted.33 The number of appellate decisions on the merits
generated by § 1292(b) is very similar to that reported in the Appendix,
while the rate of granting applications is higher than that found thirty years
ago.
With regard to certification by district courts, it is sometimes
suggested that district judges are especially reluctant to voluntarily certify
§ 1292(b) appeals given the potentially disruptive effect of such appeals
on normal case management.34 Whether these assumptions are wellgrounded is not clear.35 So to gauge recent judicial behavior, I conducted
a study of judicial rulings on motions to certify § 1292(b) appeals in 2018.
There were 248 such rulings, and 39 (15.7%) were granted.36
These are obviously small numbers given the large civil dockets of
both courts. If anything, it suggests both district courts and the court of
appeals are reluctant to certify such appeals. This is especially true given
that there is no indication that § 1292(b) certification requests are
overwhelming either the district or circuit courts, and that the Supreme
Court itself has frequently touted the use of § 1292(b) as a
Congressionally-sanctioned avenue for interlocutory appeals.

32. Id. at 1–2.
33. Id. The FJC reports variation among the circuits, with among other things the Second, Fifth,
Sixth and Ninth Circuits having relatively higher rates of granting applications, and higher numbers
of appeals decided on the merits, as compared to other circuits. Id. at 2. This is similar to the data
reported in the Appendix.
34. E.g., Daniel Klerman, Posner and Class Actions, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 1097, 1103 (2019);
Martin H. Redish, The Pragmatic Approach to Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 89, 108–09 (1975).
35. As far as I know, there is no official complication of data on how often § 1292(b) motions
are made and of the rate on which they are granted or denied. In my prior study, I conducted a review
of officially published decisions by district judges on motions to certify § 1292(b) appeals, and for
the three years of 1987 through 1989, found that there were 102 such decisions, with 61 of those being
granted. See Solimine, supra note 5, at 1197–98.
36. The search on Lexis for the decisions used “1292(b)” as a search term. See e-mail from
Alisher Kassym to Michael E. Solimine (Oct. 3, 2019, 1:25 PM) (on file with author). A list of the
decisions and their dispositions are on file with the author. The much greater number of decisions
from one year, as opposed the smaller number over three years I previously found (see supra note 35)
is likely due in large part to the prior study being restricted to officially published decisions, while
the one from 2018 included both those and officially unpublished decisions only reported on Lexis.
That said, data from one year from a database that likely does not capture all such motions should be
viewed with some caution. Anecdotally, it seems that some district judges and U.S. Magistrate Judges
are lukewarm at best to granting § 1292(b) motions, still insisting that the issues be “exceptional.”
See, e.g., Bailey v. Verso Corp., No. 3:17-cv-332, 2019 WL 665354, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 15, 2019)
(denying motion); Pinkston v. Univ. of S. Fla. Bd. of Regents, No. 8:18-cv-2651-T-33SPF, 2019 WL
1877340, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 26, 2019) (same, and referring to § ”1292(b)’s high burden”).
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The Juliana and Trump Litigations

Despite its value to federal judges and lawyers, it must be admitted
that § 1292(b) has a relatively low profile outside the legal community
(and maybe inside that community too). There have been two high-profile
exceptions to this generalization in the past two years.
One is the Juliana v. United States climate change case. That was a
case brought in 2015 by a group of children in federal court in Oregon,
who argued that actions, or inaction, by the federal government to
ameliorate the deleterious effects of climate change in general and the rise
of greenhouse gases in particular was violating their constitutional rights.
The case raises a host of complex procedural and substantive issues,
including standing, the political question doctrine, substantive due process
and other constitutional law doctrines, and the propriety of the wideranging injunctive sought by the plaintiffs against the federal
government.37
Both the Obama and Trump administrations defended the case by
filing motions to dismiss on the grounds mentioned above. The district
judge denied the motions,38 and further denied a motion to certify a
§ 1292(b) appeal.39 Seeking to avoid discovery and a trial on the merits,
the government then attempted interlocutory review by writs of
mandamus, which were denied by the Ninth Circuit. Undeterred, the
government sought mandamus relief in the Supreme Court. In two orders
in 2018, the Supreme Court denied the writs without prejudice but
remanded for further consideration of the government’s defenses. In
unusually blunt language, the Court in the first order observed that the
“breadth” of plaintiffs’ “claims [were] striking,” and added that “the
justiciability of those claims presents substantial ground for difference of
opinion,” a seeming reference to the language of § 1292(b), though the
statute was not cited.40 In the second order, denying a stay until a writ of
mandamus could be ruled upon, the Court noted that the district court had
failed to certify a § 1292(b) appeal, and further quoted its earlier order
paraphrasing the language of the statute.41 The Court denied the stay in

37. For a useful discussion of all of these issues, see Bradford Mank, Does the Evolving
Concept of Due Process in Obergefell Justify Judicial Regulation of Greenhouse Gases and Climate
Change?: Juliana v. United States, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855 (2018).
38. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Ore. 2016).
39. Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC, 2017 WL 2483705, at *2 (D. Ore. June 8,
2017). The district judge adopted a report and recommendation of the U.S. Magistrate Judge assigned
to the case to deny the certification. Id.
40. United States v. U.S. District Court, 139 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2018).
41. In re United States, 139 S. Ct. 452, 453 (2018).
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part because the government had not first requested mandamus relief from
the Ninth Circuit, but in doing so the Court seem to be strongly suggesting
that the courts below use § 1292(b) as a vehicle to obtain immediate
appellate review of the defenses.42
If only reluctantly, the lower courts followed that advice. Not long
after, the district judge revisited the § 1292(b) motion by reviewing the
protracted litigation to date, noting at some length the values of the final
judgment rule and what she considered to be the narrow interpretation of
that statute.43 “Trial courts across the country[,]” she added, “address
complex cases involving similar jurisdictional, evidentiary, and legal
questions as those presented here without resorting to certifying for
interlocutory appeal.”44 While “stand[ing]” by her “prior rulings on
jurisdictional and merits issues,” the court acknowledged that she took
“particular note of the recent orders” by the Supreme Court, and “upon
reconsideration” and without further explanation certified the § 1292(b)
appeal.45
Shortly thereafter, a panel on the Ninth Circuit accepted the appeal,
with the court explanation that the “district court properly concluded that
the issues presented in this case satisfied the standard set forth in
§ 1292(b) and properly exercised its discretion in certifying the case for
interlocutory appeal.”46 One judge on the panel issued a four-page dissent.
The dissenting judge stated that despite the holding by the district judge,
that decision, when “read as a whole,” indicated that the district judge did
not think that the § 1292(b) criteria had been satisfied.47 The dissent added
disapprovingly that the district judge seems to have “felt compelled” to
certify “even though—as the rest of its order suggests—the court did not
believe it to be true.”48 Given the language of § 1292(b) and the district
court’s “superior vantage point,” the dissent concluded that the lower
court’s de facto failure to certify deprived the appellate court of
jurisdiction.49
There is much to process in Juliana from a § 1292(b) perspective.
And then, about seven months later, we were presented with yet another
42. See id.
43. Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-cv-01517-AA, 2018 WL 6303774, at *1–2 (D. Or. Nov.
21, 2018).
44. Id. at *3.
45. Id.
46. Order at 2, Juliana v. United States, 949 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2018).
47. Id. at 1127 (Friedland, J., dissenting).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1128 (Friedland, J., dissenting). The Ninth Circuit ultimately reversed the district
court’s decision on the merits. See Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020).
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high profile decision on § 1292(b), the Fourth Circuit’s decision in In re
Donald J. Trump.50 That case was a highly publicized suit by the District
of Columbia and the State of Maryland in Maryland federal court, against
the President, on the basis that his continued business interests resulted in
his receiving money and benefits from foreign governments and persons
which, it was argued, violated the Foreign and Domestic Emoluments
Clauses.51 Not unlike the Juliana case, the district court heard, and denied,
a series of motions to dismiss on the basis of, among other things, lack of
standing, and for failure to state a claim.52 The district judge also refused
to certify a § 1292(b), on the basis that the statutory criteria had not been
met.53 The President then sought a writ of mandamus in the court of
appeals, seeking an order that the district judge to certify the appeal.
The Fourth Circuit granted the writ of mandamus. While
acknowledging the discretion granted district judges under § 1292(b), the
court held that the district court abused its discretion by not concluding
that there was substantial ground for a difference of opinion.54 The court
noted that the district court issued the first decision ever holding that a
party could pursue relief for alleged violation of the Emoluments Clauses
for alleged competitive injury, and that the holding was contrary to a
recent prior decision in the Southern District of New York: in a virtually
identical case brought by different plaintiffs.55 The court also concluded
that the other criteria of § 1292(b) had been met.56 Still, the court went out
of its way to emphasize that granting a writ of mandamus in these
circumstances “should be rare and occur only when a clear abuse of
discretion is demonstrated,” and also mentioned, albeit with little
elaboration, the “unique circumstances of this case.”57 The court
proceeded to immediately reach the merits of the case, rather than
“pointlessly go[ing] through the motions of certifying.”58

50. In re Trump, 928 F.3d 360 (4th Cir. 2019).
51. Id. at 362.
52. Id. at 362–64.
53. District of Columbia v. Trump, 344 F. Supp. 3d 828, 841 (D. Md. 2018).
54. See In re Trump, 928 F.3d at 369–70.
55. Id. at 370–71.
56. Id. at 371–72.
57. Id. at 372 (emphasis in original).
58. Id. In a very similar case with similar litigation history, brought in the District of Columbia,
the D.C. Circuit, relying in part on the Fourth Circuit’s decision in In re Trump, denied a writ of
mandamus without prejudice, and remanded to the district court “for immediate reconsideration of
the motion to certify” under § 1292(b). In re Trump, 781 Fed. Appx. 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (per
curiam). See also Blumenthal v. Trump, No. 17-1154 (EGS), 2019 WL 3948478 (D.D.C. Aug. 21,
2019) (certifying § 1292(b) appeal after remand), appeal accepted, In re Trump, No. 19-8005, 2019
WL 4200443 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 4, 2019), rev’d, 949 F.3d 14 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (per curiam).
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The panel decision was reversed by the Fourth Circuit sitting en
banc.59 An eight-judge majority held that mandamus relief was
inappropriate because the district judge’s decision not to certify a §
1292(b) appeal was essentially unreviewable. The majority argued that
the text and legislative history of § 1292(b) clearly indicated that both the
district and appellate court was vested with discretion whether or not to
allow an appeal under that provision.60 It follows, the court continued, that
for mandamus purposes there was no “clear and indisputable” right to
have an appeal certified, and to allow it would be “particularly
problematic when doing so circumvents the specific process Congress has
prescribed for seeking interlocutory review.”61 The majority did not rule
out the possibI have not seen this in the federal reporter yetility of issuing
a writ of mandamus in an “appropriate case” in this context, but it must
be one where the district court “ignored a request for certification, denied
such a request based on nothing more than caprice, or made its decision
in manifest bad faith.”62 But those circumstances were not present here,
the court concluded, because the “district court promptly recognized and
ruled on the request for certification in a detailed written opinion that
applied the correct legal standards.”63
Six judges dissented on the § 1292(b) issue. The principal dissent on
that point64 argued, similar to the original panel, that the “district court’s
orders are paradigmatic orders for certification under § 1292(b), and that
the district court clearly abused its discretion and usurped appellate
jurisdiction in refusing to certify them.”65 The dissent allowed that while
§ 1292(b) “indisputably confers broad discretion upon district courts . . .
the statute does not provide that a district court’s exercise of that
discretion is unfettered and unreviewable.”66 “A holistic review of the
district court’s decisions,” the dissent continued, “reveals both a clear
abuse of discretion . . . and a judicial usurpation of power in this most
unusual case against the President,” making mandamus relief
appropriate.67

59. In re Trump, 958 F.3d 274 ( 4th Cir.2020) (en banc).
60. Id. at 282–83.
61. Id. at 283.
62. Id. at 285.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 309 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). Judge Wilkinson separately dissented on other issue,
but noted that he agreed with Judge Niemeyer’s dissent regarding § 1292(b). Id. at 291 n.1 (Wilkinson,
J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 315 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
66. Id.
67. Id.
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The Juliana and Trump cases were unusual in many ways, but they
can still provide insights on more conventional litigation involving
§ 1292(b). For one thing, both cases seem classic examples of the
appropriate use of the statute, and the district judges can be fairly
criticized for not granting motions to certify at least some of the issues in
the cases. The standing and substantive due process claims in Juliana, and
the state standing and Emoluments Clauses claims in Trump, stand out as
issues that seem to readily satisfy the statutory criteria. That is, all of those
claims were not routine ones (either fact-intensive or resolvable by settled
law), and their resolution would likely “materially advance” the litigation:
potentially ending them in favor of one of the parties. For another thing,
both cases easily satisfy any requirement of “exceptional” litigation or a
“big case” (however those terms might be defined) given the parties and
the high-profile political stakes involved.68
In addition to not certifying the cases, the district judge decisions
were also characterized by their limited or unsatisfactory explanations. I
have earlier observed that an appreciable number of district and circuit
decisions certifying, or not certifying, under § 1292(b) do not discuss the
statutory requirements in detail, and instead simply recite the language
with little elaboration.69 That was true in Juliana. The district judge there
issued a decision that could be (and was, by one circuit judge) interpreted
as holding that the criteria were not met, yet then proceeded to certify the

68. On this point, it is worth noting President Trump contributed to § 1292(b) jurisprudence in
another case. In In re Trump, 874 F.3d 948 (6th Cir. 2017), the court of appeals accepted a
certification. The case grew out of a campaign rally by then-presidential candidate Trump, where he
responded to protesters by saying, among other things, “Get ‘em out of here.” Allegedly in response,
three protesters were assaulted by others at the rally, and they subsequently sued Trump in federal
court in Kentucky for “incitement to riot,” which is prohibited by Kentucky statutes. The district court
denied a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, but certified a § 1292(b) appeal. Both the district and appellate courts
held that there was a “controlling issue of law,” since it involved the interpretation of statutes, and
there was a legal question of whether the statutes violated the First Amendment. Also, there was a
“substantial ground for difference of opinion,” since (the Sixth Circuit said) “fair-minded jurists might
reach” different conclusions on the First Amendment defense, and an “immediate appeal may
materially advance the termination of the litigation,” since “litigation would end” if the defense were
accepted. The court added that to fall under § 1292(b), a case must be “exceptional,” and however
one might define that term, this case satisfied it, since it was “exceptional in many waysFalseThe
practical and political consequences of [this] case are readily apparent.” Id. at 951–52. Subsequently,
after briefing on the merits, the court reversed the denial of the motion to dismiss, holding that
Trump’s speech enjoyed First Amendment protection because it did not specifically advocate
imminent lawless action. Nwanguma v. Trump, 903 F.3d 604, 613 (6th Cir. 2018).
69. Solimine, supra note 5, at 1200.
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appeal.70 Likewise, while the initial Fourth Circuit panel decision in
Trump had considered it a “paradigmatic case for certification,”71 in part
because there was a substantial ground for a difference of opinion on the
standing issue, given the conflicting district court ruling in another
circuit.72 Earlier in its opinion, the court of appeals described the district
judge’s decision refusing certification as one that “reiterated [the]
reasoning of its earlier rulings [on the merits].”73
In my view, the initial panel decision correctly characterized the
district judge’s decision. To its credit, the district court issued a full
opinion on the § 1292(b) certification motion, but as I read it, much of the
decision consists of summaries of the respective positions of the parties
on certification.74 Beyond that, the district judge felt that the President was
mostly expressing disagreement with the prior rulings denying his
motions to dismiss, and likewise distinguished (and disagreed with) the
district court decision from the Second Circuit.75 I’m not faulting the
district judge for disagreeing with the other court, or for being confident
in his earlier rulings, but that confidence does not prevent the satisfaction
of the § 1292(b) criteria.
Both Juliana and Trump also present the issue of whether an
appellate court should use the writ of mandamus to review a district
judge’s decision not to certify a § 1292(b) appeal. The issuance of such a
70. See supra notes 43–49 and accompanying text. The district court was not a model of clarity
in deciding a motion to certify in its two encounters with the issue. In its first decision on a motion to
certify, the district judge referred the recertification issue to a U.S. Magistrate Judge, who then issued
a Report and Recommendation. Cf. WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 3929 at 373 (stating that the
“certification power cannot be delegated to a magistrate judge in a case tried by a district judge,” but
citing a case where the Magistrate Judge had decided the issue without issuing a report and without
further review by the district judge). Id. at 373 n.29 (citing Vitols v. Citizens Banking Co., 984 F.2d
168 (6th Cir. 1993) (per curiam)). However, the Magistrate Judge’s decision, Juliana v. United States,
No. 6:15-cv-1517-TC, 2017 WL 9249531 (D. Ore. May 1, 2017) (Coffin, M.J.), for the most part
simply reiterates the merits discussion in a previous report which recommended that motions to
dismiss be denied. The court cited the statutory language, but on my reading, did not explicitly discuss
why the criteria had not been met, with the exception of the “question of law” requirement. On that
front, the court observed that “numerous factual questions” on climate change would need to be
addressed at trial. Id. at *8. That’s true, but there were several antecedent defenses raised (e.g.,
standing; the political question and public trust doctrines) that presented relatively pure questions of
law. With virtually no discussion, the district court accepted the Magistrate Judge’s decision. See
supra note 39 and accompanying text.
71. In re Trump, 928 F.3d at 371.
72. Id. at 371–72.
73. Id. at 368.
74. District of Columbia v. Trump, 344 F. Supp. 3d 828, 833–36 (D. Md. 2018).
75. Id. at 834, 836–39. The decision from the S.D.N.Y. was subsequently reversed (by a
noninterlocutory appeal) in a 2-1 decision. See CREW v. Trump, 939 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2019). That
decision does not undermine the point made in the text, since there was conflicting authority at the
time the district judge in the Fourth Circuit declined to certify the appeal.
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writ would permit the circuit court to certify an appeal and proceed to hear
it on the merits. The straightforward argument against that option is that
it flouts the dual certification requirement of the statute. That requirement
was put in place to limit the number of interlocutory appeals. If the court
of appeals is permitted to review and potentially reverse a failure of a
district judge to certify, that results in unilateral certification. Once the
district judge refuses to certify, the § 1292(b) option comes to an end.76
Most decisions recognize this point,77 while adding that a litigant is not
totally without recourse, since it can instead seek a mandamus review
“directed to the underlying order.”78
Yet there is a circuit split on this issue.79 The contrary argument
against unreviewable district court discretion points out that § 1292(b)
states that a district judge “shall” certify if the criteria are met, and argues
that the statutory text and the legislative history does not explicitly forbid
review (by mandamus, at least) by the appellate court.80 Also supporting
review, it is argued is that even those courts in the no-review camp
sometimes strongly suggest that the district court should after remand
certify the appeal, given the appeals court conclusion that the criteria had
been satisfied.81 This seems tantamount to review of the certification order
by the appellate court, despite earlier disclaimers that no such review is
possible. If the no-review position is so correct, it might be argued, then
appellate courts should not gratuitously (or perhaps not so gratuitously
after all) advise the district judge to certify an appeal.
Aspects of this debate were played out in the Juliana and Trump
litigation. Recall that in Juliana, the district judge once refused to certify,
but later did so after the Supreme Court, not once but twice, strongly
76. WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 3929 at 371–73.
77. E.g., In re Ford Motor Co., 344 F.3d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 2002); In re Powerhouse Licensing,
LLC, 441 F.3d 467, 471 n.1 (6th Cir. 2006); Arthur Young & Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 549 F.2d 686,
698 (9th Cir. 1977); Plum Tree, Inc. v. Stockment, 488 F.2d 754, 755 n.1 (3d Cir. 1973).
78. Ford Motor, 344 F.3d at 654.
79. As it is described in In re Trump, 781 Fed. Appx. 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (per curiam).
80. Cassandra Burke Robertson, Appellate Review of Discovery Orders in Federal Court: A
Suggested Approach for Handling Privilege Claims, 81 WASH. L. REV. 733, 779–85 (2006);
Mackenzie M. Horton, Comment, Mandamus, Stop in the Name of Discretion: The Judicial “Myth”
of the District Court’s Absolute and Unreviewable Discretion in Section 1292(B) Certification, 64
BAYLOR L. REV. 976, 985–86, 991–96 (2012).
81. Horton, supra note 80, at 989–91 (discussing, inter alia, Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 671
F.2d 426, 431–32 (11th Cir. 1982)); DeMasi v. Weiss, 669 F.2d 114, 123 (3d Cir. 1982); In re
McClelland Eng’rs, Inc., 742 F.2d 837, 837–38 (5th Cir. 1984)). See also In re Gee, 941 F.3d 153,
172–73 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (not directly addressing whether mandamus can be used to review
district court’s denial of § 1292(b) motion, but denying mandamus petition without prejudice, and
strongly suggesting that district judge on remand certify a § 1292(b) appeal on whether plaintiffs have
standing).
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encouraged the judge to so certify. And so the district judge did, as did the
Ninth Circuit.82 The initial panel decision of the Fourth Circuit in Trump
argued at length that the district judge’s refusal to certify was “a clear
abuse of discretion.”83 It then held that “there is no mechanism for prompt
appellate review . . . and because the district court erred so clearly . . . we
conclude that granting the President’s petition for mandamus is
appropriate.”84 It supported this holding by referencing a few cases from
other circuits that had held that mandamus review was appropriate,85
though it also stated that such review should be “rare” and only when there
was a “clear abuse of discretion.”86
The arguments advanced in favor of some type of review of district
judge denials of certification, at least in some cases, are not without force.
For a variety of reasons, at least some of the legal issues in both Juliana
and Trump seem appropriate for § 1292(b) certification, and one is
tempted to agree that at least in such cases, rare in number, mandamus
review of the district court’s decision not to certify should be allowed. I
nevertheless agree with Professor Wright and his co-authors that “the
temptation should be resisted.”87 Even if the statute, literally read, does
not forbid this result, the structure of § 1292(b) as a whole vests power in
the district judge to certify, and the court of appeals only acts after such
certification is lodged with it. It undermines this process to permit
mandamus to review the district judge, even if for some undefined rare or
exceptional cases. Perhaps some review mechanism should be put in
place, but that is not how the statute is currently written.88 As the courts
in the no-review camp have suggested, the better solution is to permit
mandamus on the underlying district court decision directly, rather than
“subvert the structure” of § 1292(b).89 Granted, this is no panacea. Any
82. See supra notes 38–49 and accompanying text. It is also worth noting that in the
Emoluments Clause litigation in the D.C. Circuit, see supra note 79, the district court, after declining
to certify a § 1292(b) appeal, was admonished by the appellate court, and subsequently did certify the
appeal, Blumenthal v. Trump, No. 17-1154 (EGS), 2019 WL 3948478 (D.D.C. Aug. 8, 2019), which
was promptly accepted by the D.C. Circuit, In re Trump, No. 19-8005, 2019 WL 4200443 (D.C. Cir.
Sept. 4, 2019).
83. In re Trump, 928 F.3d 360, 371 (4th Cir. 2019).
84. Id. at 371–72.
85. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (noting the cases cited did not mention the circuit
split on the issue, or the cases that held that mandamus review was inappropriate).
86. Trump, 928 F.3d at 372.
87. WRIGHT, supra note 16, at 374 (footnote omitted).
88. Id. at 374–75, 511. The Supreme Court’s rule-making authority under the 1990 and 1992
statutes might be another way to authorize review of no-certification decisions. See infra Part III(B).
89. Id. at 511. Thus, I agree with the holding and analysis on this issue by the en banc majority
in In re Trump. To the extent district courts are reluctant to certify § 1292(b) appeals in the first
instance, see supra note 34, a robust embrace of mandamus review would inevitably lead to more
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review by mandamus is meant to be narrow,90 and in contrast, review of a
decision with dual certification under § 1292(b) is plenary.91 Still,
mandamus review would be available to deal with the truly exceptional
and unusual case, despite a questionable lack of certification by a district
judge. On that score, a good case for review by mandamus can be made
for at least some of the issues raised in Juliana and Trump, as compared
to the more conventional litigation that characterizes the vast majority of
cases in federal court.
While Juliana and Trump are, to be sure, unusual cases, they can
illustrate the appropriate use of § 1292(b) in ordinary civil litigation as
well. Not every motion to certify an interlocutory decision by an unhappy
litigant is going to satisfy the criteria of § 1292(b). But in my view, both
district and court of appeals judges should not approach such motions with
an effective presumption against (or in favor of) granting such motions.
Instead, such certification requests should be viewed as another aspect of
pretrial management, to be used when, after dispassionate consideration,
the courts deem the statutory criteria to be satisfied.
My embrace of § 1292(b) will not go down well with its critics, who
argue that the statute’s myriad requirements—dual certification; the
sometimes hard-to-apply criteria; the sometimes-applied “exceptional,
big-case” factor—all make it an awkward and relatively little-used option
for interlocutory appeal.92 Instead, they argue that developing precise
criteria to ex ante designate certain types of orders as worthy of immediate
review is an impossible task, and typically argue that the court of appeals
should instead be vested with discretion to decide whether to hear an
interlocutory appeal on a case-by-case basis, balancing the pros and cons
of allowing an interlocutory appeal for that particular case.93 I am not
oblivious to this critique but do not find it convincing. The proposed
alternatives are not without their own weaknesses, such as potentially
such certifications being sought in the trial courts, and more efforts to seek appellate review of denials
of such motions. These are not necessarily bad things, but they could be the unintended consequence
of ignoring the present statutory scheme. Also, although I am no fan of the collateral order doctrine,
in part because it has been undermined by the use of § 1292(b), see infra Part III, infra, nonetheless
perhaps that doctrine might be another basis to secure appellate review of district court decisions in
some instances.
90. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004). For further discussion of the
sometimes unclear elements appellate courts apply in deciding whether to grant or deny mandamus,
see Steinman, supra note 26, at 1257–70.
91. WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 3929.1 at 414.
92. E.g., Martineau, supra note 3, at 767–70; Redish, supra note 34, at 108–09.
93. Martineau, supra note 3, at 786–87; Redish, supra note 34, at 92–96. See also John C.
Nagle, Note, Replacing the Crazy Quilt of Interlocutory Appeals Jurisprudence with Discretionary
Review, 44 DUKE L.J. 200, 214–22 (2004) (agreeing with Martineau proposal).
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creating a new stream of satellite litigation in the appellate courts. This
potential would surely follow after the institution of a policy to entertain
and decide all, or nearly all, motions to certify interlocutory appeals on a
case-by-case basis. More importantly, § 1292(b), for all of its
complications, in my view, tolerably accommodates the pros and cons of
permitting some interlocutory appeals, and in practice has been used more
often that realized to send a wide variety of district court orders for
immediate appellate review.94
III. THE TWILIGHT OF THE COLLATERAL ORDER DOCTRINE
The collateral order doctrine is another exception to the final
judgment rule. As typically articulated by courts, it has no direct
connection to permissive interlocutory appeals under § 1292(b). But there
are indirect connections, and as I will argue, the continued viability and
use of the latter should have negative jurisprudential consequences for the
former. In this section, I outline the collateral order doctrine, the
considerable criticisms it has long endured, and suggest how the existence
of § 1292(b), and the Supreme Court’s rule-making authority on
interlocutory appeals established by statutes in 1990 and 1992, should
limit the further development of the doctrine, and perhaps even herald its
demise.
A.

The Collateral Order Doctrine and Its Discontents

The genesis of the collateral order doctrine is the Supreme Court’s
decision in 1949 in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.95 In an
opinion by Justice Robert Jackson, the Court construed the final judgment
rule to permit an immediate appeal of a trial court decision in a diversity,
94. WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 3931 (giving numerous examples of orders certified under
§ 1292(b)); Solimine, supra note 5, at 1204–05 (same through 1990, including numerous cases that
have reached the Supreme Court). For a sampling of more recent Supreme Court cases decided on the
merits, that reached the Court via § 1292(b), see Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 575 U.S. 480 (2015);
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005);
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005); Jones v. R.R. Donnelley &
Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Breur v. Jim’s Concrete of
Brevard, Inc., 538 U.S. 691 (2003); Bartnicki v. Vooper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001); Harris Trust & Sav.
Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 530 U.S. 238 (2000). One might argue that greater use of
§ 1292(b) appeals, as suggested in Part II of this Article, will lead to a torrent of motions for such
appeals at the district court level. There is always such a possibility, but it can be policed by careful
application of the statutory criteria, as well as district judge’s ability to sanction frivolous motions.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 11. See also Bryan Lammon, Three Ideas for Discretionary Appeals, 53 AKRON
L. REV. 639 (2020) (proposing amendments to § 1292(b)).
95. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
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shareholder derivative action, following a state law requiring the plaintiff
to post security for payment of expenses if plaintiff were to lose the suit.96
The Court acknowledged that the district court’s interlocutory decision
would not ordinarily be appealable under the final judgment rule,97 but
held that it was in this instance. The Court reasoned that the order was not
related to the merits, and it would be “too late [to] effectively review” the
decision on appeal from a final judgment.98 An order, then, could be
immediately appealable if it was “separable from, and collateral to, rights
asserted in the action,” was “too important to be denied review,” and was
“too independent of the cause itself” to require the case to proceed to a
final judgment.99 The Court added its analysis was supported by the fact
that that it had “long given [§ 1291(a)] practical rather than a technical
construction.”100
A review of the many collateral order decisions from the Supreme
Court, addressing other types of district court orders, is unnecessary
here.101 Suffice it to say that the Court at first seemed to expansively apply
the doctrine for almost three decades, then started to hold fewer examples
of the Cohen criteria being met. A significant turning point, as some see
it,102 was in 1978 when the Court unanimously held in Coopers & Lybrand
v. Livesay103 that denials of motions by plaintiffs to certify a class action
were interlocutory decisions that did not qualify as a collateral order. As
the doctrine comes down to us today, the Court has recently stated that it
covers “[t]hat small category includ[ing] only decisions that are
conclusive, that involve important questions separate from the merits, and
that are effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment in the
underlying action.”104
As Bryan Lammon has recently observed, “[r]arely is the collateralorder doctrine mentioned without accompanying criticism.”105 This
criticism might at first blush seem surprising. The invocation of
pragmatism of Cohen is a mark of 20th century jurisprudence, and as
96. Id. at 545–46.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 546.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. For an overview of those decisions, see Bryan Lammon, Finality, Appealability, and the
Scope of Interlocutory Review, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1809, 1838–42 (2018); Steinman, supra note 26,
at 1248–51.
102. Martineau, supra note 3, at 740–41.
103. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
104. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009) (quoting Swint v. Chambers
Cty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 42 (1995)).
105. Lammon, supra note 101, at 1842 (footnote omitted).
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Stephen Yeazell has suggested: “the need for [interlocutory appeals] must
have seemed more pressing with the adoption of procedural rules [i.e., the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938] that lengthened the pretrial
process and made it less likely that cases would ever come to trial.”106 And
it is not hard to suggest that the doctrine might never had been announced
in 1949 had § 1292(b) existed at the time. Consequently, Cohen might be
viewed as a necessary precursor till § 1292(b) was enacted.
But praise for Cohen, despite these factors and its distinguished
author, was not meant to be. Among the subsequent criticisms is the basis
for the doctrine: it is difficult to glean the multi-part test from the spare
language, or the legislative purpose, of § 1291, so much so that it is de
rigueur for commentators to instead label it as judicially created.107 To be
sure, the Cohen decision claimed it was merely engaging in a “practical”
rather than a “technical” interpretation of that statute which, it claimed, it
had “long” done.108 The claim is unconvincing,109 but in a later case the
Court went out of its way to emphasize that Cohen was engaging in
statutory interpretation, not creating an exception to the statute.110
More important than its provenance is the substantive critique that
the Court (and lower courts) have been unable to apply the doctrine’s
criteria in a consistent and principled fashion. In short, the Court has not
been clear or consistent about how to determine if an order is an
“important” one “separate from the merits,” or when an order is
“effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.”111
106. Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 WIS.
L. REV. 631, 662 (1994).
107. E.g., Martineau, supra note 3, at 739 (“created by judicial decision”); Aaron R. Petty, The
Hidden Harmony of Appellate Jurisdiction, 62 S.C. L. REV. 353, 360 (2010) (“judicially-crafted
exception”); Redish, supra note 34, at 111 (“judicially created”); Steinman, supra note 26, at 1247
(“judicial invention”).
108. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
109. WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 3911 at 332 (2d ed. 1992) (the “three cases relied upon to
establish the ‘practical’ construction of the finality requirement provide only remote support for this
result.”) (footnote omitted); Steinman, supra note 26, at 1249 & n.90 (pointing out that no case prior
to Cohen had recognized an exception from the final judgment rule not grounded in a statute, and that
none of the three cases the Court cited for its “long . . . practical” construction of § 1291 squarely
supports such a construction).
110. Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994).
111. For useful overviews of the cases and the difficulties the Court has shown in applying the
criteria in a coherent and consistent fashion, see RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A
MODERN APPROACH 1098–1106 (7th ed. 2018); Lloyd C. Anderson, The Collateral Order Doctrine:
A New “Serbonian Bog’ and Four Proposals for Reform, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 539, 551–85 (1998);
Lammon, supra note 101, at 1838–42; Petty, supra note 107, at 377–86; Steinman, supra note 26, at
1250–57. It is no small irony that commentators have persuasively argued that in light of how the
Cohen criteria have been applied in later cases, it’s doubtful that Cohen was rightly decided. See
Martineau, supra note 3, at 742 (arguing that the harm of applying the state statute was only “financial,
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Apparently not oblivious to these criticisms, the Court has emphasized the
“importance” of the issue from which immediate appeal is sought, a word
found in all formulations of the doctrine going back to Cohen. The Court
has suggested that the source of the right will inform its importance, so
that a right “originating in the Constitution or statutes” should be regarded
as more important than a “privately conferred right” created by a
contract.112 But even that formulation still leaves open considerable
uncertainties, such that it seems a “process of ad hoc balancing that
focuses on the Court’s perception of the importance of the interest in
avoiding trial.”113
As examples of these criticisms, consider two well-known Court
decisions, one holding the Cohen criteria to be met, the other not. In the
aforementioned Coppers & Lybrand decision, the Court held that the
criteria were not satisfied. In the space of one paragraph, the Court
reasoned that a denial of class certification was not conclusive, since it
could be revised by the district court; was not separate from the merits,
since it “involves considerations that are enmeshed in the factual and legal
issues comprising the plaintiff’s cause of action;” and was not effectively
unreviewable after a final judgment, since the named plaintiff or
intervening class members could then appeal the order.114 In the
immediately following part of its opinion, the Court also rejected an
analytically separate argument that an interlocutory appeal should be
allowed if the denial of class certification would be the “death knell” of
plaintiff’s case, since given the small amount of individual damages
involved, the case could only be economically brought as a class action.115
On that point, the Court expressed concerns with the uncertainty of
not legal” since the trial court order “would not prevent continuance of the suit, but at worst would
only require the posting of security.”); Redish, supra note 34, at 112–13 (arguing that the Cohen
decision “did not explain why refusing to allow immediate appeal in that case would result in
irreparable loss.”).
112. Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 879 (1994).
113. MARCUS, supra note 111, at 1103. See also WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 3911.5 at 430 (the
importance requirement as had a “checkered career”). Yet another complication of the collateral order
doctrine is that in practice, lawyers will frequently brief both whether the doctrine applies to permit
an interlocutory appeal (if the cases are unclear with respect to that particular order), and the merits
of the case. If the court decides that the doctrine is not satisfied, then the briefing on the merits has
been wasted. Steinman, supra note 26, at 1271–72. In contrast, this can be avoided in § 1292(b)
appeals, if the parties first brief, and a motions panel on the court of appeals first decides, whether to
accept the appeal. That said, it is apparently not unusual for both the § 1292(b) issue and the merits
to be briefed, and sometimes the same panel will decide both. See, e.g., In re Text Messaging Antitrust
Litigation, 630 F.3d 622, 627 (7th Cir. 2010).
114. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 (1978).
115. Id. at 477. See also WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 3912 at 439–59 (discussing whether and to
what extent the death knell doctrine fits with the collateral order doctrine).
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defining a “death knell”; with courts of appeals becoming bogged down
in heavily factual, time-consuming disputes in applying that term in
individual appeals; and with reconciling the proposed death-knell
exception with the purposes of the final judgment rule, and the existence
of § 1292(b) as an already-existing safety value to potentially hear such
appeals.116
On just the collateral order doctrine, the Court’s analysis, comprised
of “three terse sentences,”117 is not a model of robust analysis. The Court’s
reasoning was formalistically correct but arguably paid short shrift to the
practicalities of class action litigation. Yes, an order denying class
certification could be revisited by the district court, but that’s true of
virtually any interlocutory decision. Yes, to various degrees the
determination of whether the criteria of Rule 23 has been satisfied
overlaps with the evidence to be presented on the merits of the case, but
the degree can vary if it occurs at all.118 Finally, yes, a plaintiff can appeal,
after final judgment, an order denying class certification, but that seems
oblivious to the point that the plaintiff won’t pursue the suit at all if the
denial is truly the “death-knell” of the case.119
In another important decision, the Supreme Court held in 1985 in
Mitchell v. Forsyth120 that in civil rights actions, denials of motions to
dismiss or for summary judgment based on the qualified immunity
defense satisfied the Cohen criteria and were immediately appealable.
Properly understood, the Court held the qualified immunity defense was
“an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation,”
and thus, was an “immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to
116. Id. at 471–76.
117. Michael E. Solimine & Christine Oliver Hines, Deciding to Decide: Class Action
Certification and Interlocutory Review by the United States Courts of Appeals Under Rule23(f), 41
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1531, 1555 (2000). See also WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 3912 at 459 (the
collateral order doctrine was “easily put aside.”).
118. Subsequently, the Supreme Court held in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338
(2011), involving whether the Rule 23(a)(2) & (b) had been satisfied, that the inquiry “entail[ed] some
overlap with the merits of plaintiff’s underlying claims.” Id. at 351 (citing, inter alia, Coopers &
Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 469).
119. I am not necessarily arguing that the case was wrongly decided, only that it presented a
more difficult issue under the Cohen criteria than the Court let on in one paragraph. As the Court itself
observed, there was a circuit split on the issue. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 465, n.2. That said,
the Court spent considerable time analyzing the “death knell” doctrine, and the possible use of
§ 1292(b) as an alternative to the collateral order doctrine. On the latter point, the Court seemed
particularly influenced by a then-recent opinion by noted Judge Henry Friendly, extolling the benefits
of § 1292(b) as an alternative to the doctrine to review class action certification decisions. Id. at 475
n.27 (citing and quoting Parkinson v. April Indus., Inc., 520 F.2d 650, 660 (2d Cir. 1975) (Friendly,
J., concurring)).
120. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
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liability.”121 Thus, a denial of the defense made it “effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.”122 Moreover, the Court
explained that the immunity was an issue of law—an inquiry as to whether
the “legal norms” the defendants allegedly violated were “clearly
established” at the time, and thus, was “conceptually distinct from the
merits of the plaintiff’s claim that his rights had been violated.”123
Unlike the unanimous decision in Coopers & Lybrand, Mitchell was
a 4-3 decision on the issue of appealability. In his partial dissent, Justice
William Brennan argued that the qualified immunity defense “is not
identical to the ultimate question on the merits, but the two are quite
closely related.”124 He also argued that the defense was not conceptually
different from other immunities, or other defenses like lack of jurisdiction
or the statute of limitations, all of which are effectively lost if a trial court
denial is not immediately reviewed.125
I have recently argued that the dissent in Mitchell got the better of
the argument.126 On the separate from the merits prong, I suggested that
that the qualified immunity defense, with its inquiry into clearly
established law at the time of the events giving rise to suit, “overlaps in
most cases with the facts and merits of the case.”127 On the effectively
unreviewable prong, I argued that the defense is much like lack of
jurisdiction and many other “procedural” defenses that are completely lost
if a motion to dismiss raising those issues is denied.128 I also observed that
Mitchell (or Coopers & Lybrand, for that matter) had little explicit
discussion of the “importance” of the defense raised. Recall that was a
factor briefly mentioned in Cohen, and then resurrected in some decisions
after Coopers & Lybrand and Mitchell were decided.129 On that front, the
dispute in the former case was between private parties, governed by a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure applicable to all litigation. It is difficult
to label that as “important” in the sense of being drawn on the Constitution
or federal statutes. On the other hand, for the latter case, the qualified
immunity defense is a frequently litigated issue in civil rights actions
involving public officials, and is drawn (at least in part) from federal
121. Id. at 526 (emphasis in original).
122. Id. at 526–27.
123. Id. at 527–28.
124. Id. at 545 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
125. Id. at 551–53.
126. Michael E. Solimine, Are Interlocutory Qualified Immunity Appeals Lawful?, 94 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. ONLINE 169 (2019).
127. Id. at 176.
128. Id. at 177.
129. See supra notes 99, 112 and accompanying text.
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statutes like 42 U.S.C. § 1983, so a better case can be made there for
meeting the “importance” criterion.130
B.

Section 1292(b), Rulemaking, and the Collateral Order Doctrine

Putting aside its ragged application, there are at least two reasons to
suggest that the collateral order doctrine rests on shakable jurisprudential
foundations, so much so that the doctrine might be narrowed even more
than it is, or perhaps even abandoned entirely. One reason is the passage
of § 1292(b) nine years after the Cohen decision. As I’ve pointed out,131
the Court has frequently cited § 1292(b) in the course of decisions holding
that a particular trial court order does not fall under the collateral order
doctrine. The Court does this to emphasize that there is a safety valve
available for litigants to possibly ameliorate, on a case-by-case basis, the
sometimes-harsh effects of the final judgment rule. Permissive
interlocutory appeals in this regard are particularly attractive, the Court
has emphasized, since application of the collateral order doctrine requires
the “blunt, categorical instrument” that an entire class of orders be subject
to immediate appeal.132 In short, the Court seems to cite this safety valve
as an additional justification to apply the doctrine in a (mostly) narrow
fashion. Interestingly, the Court has sometimes not cited § 1292(b) on the
few occasions it has held that the doctrine does apply to an order.133 The
upshot is that the mere possibility of the use of the § 1292(b) option
suggests a significant brake on, or perhaps even the total demise, of the
collateral order doctrine.134
In other words, perhaps § 1292(b) can be regarded as preemptive of
any interpretations of (much less “judge-made” exceptions to) § 1291,
prior to 1958, that resulted in exceptions to the final judgment rule. One
130. Solimine, supra note 126, at 177–78. The exact provenance and scope of the qualified
immunity defense is currently a hotly contested one in the case law and the academic literature. Id. at
170.
131. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
132. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 110–12 (2009).
133. E.g., P. R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 (1993) (denial
of sovereign immunity defense under the Eleventh Amendment satisfied the collateral order doctrine).
The majority opinion in Mitchell makes no mention of § 1292(b), even though a certification was
denied in the district court, and its relevance was briefed in the Supreme Court. Solimine, supra note
126, at 181 n.94. The dissent did mention the possibility of its use in qualified immunity cases.
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 554 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
134. The Court suggested as much, albeit without extended discussion, in a case finding the
doctrine not applicable to immediately review an order denying a stay of proceedings due to parallel
litigation in another court: Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 288 n.21
(1988) (citing with approval a case that made that argument, Olson v. Paine, Webber, Jackson &
Curtis, Inc., 806 F.2d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.)).
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problem with this argument is that the text of § 1292(b) has no language
of preemption. Nor does the legislative history, which, perhaps
surprisingly, appears to make no reference to the collateral order doctrine.
Only a year after the passage of § 1292(b), no less an authority than
Professor Wright concluded that the new statute was only an addition to,
and did not replace, the collateral order doctrine.135 He reasoned, even at
this early stage, that the doctrine is best regarded as statutorily based, in
that it recognizes an order “sufficiently separable from the main action to
be regarded as final decisions and appealable as of right under” § 1291.136
Thus, § 1292(b) simply adds another exception. Professor Wright’s
conclusions are sound, even given that the doctrine appeared to enjoy a
relatively robust life in the courts of appeals in the decade after Cohen.137
The other, stronger reason to question the continued viability of the
collateral order doctrine is Congressional action in the early 1990s. Those
actions followed upon the convening of, and the resultant report of, the
Federal Courts Study Committee.138 Concerned with a variety of issues
including court congestion, delays, and expense in the federal court
system, the Report also remarked on the complicated and confusing
regime of interlocutory appeals, and recommended that Congress take
action to authorize the Supreme Court by rulemaking to authorize such
appeals.139 Congress took the advice by passing two statutes. The Rules
Enabling Act was amended in 1990 to give the Court rulemaking power
to “define when a ruling of a district court is final for the purposes of
appeal under section 1291.”140 In 1992, § 1292 (already the statutory
repository of several exceptions to the final judgment rule) was amended
to permit the Court by rule “to provide for an appeal of an interlocutory
decision to the courts of appeal that is not otherwise provided for” in

135. Wright, supra note 12, at 202–03.
136. Id. at 203. He also referred to other exceptions, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b), as not being
preempted either, since “it is now too well settled by a substantial body of case law that they are to
be regarded as final decisions to treat them as interlocutory at this late date.” Id. On the other hand,
he argued that the new statute should limit the use of writs of mandamus, in the sense of being a signal
to the appellate court not to grant such a writ, if the district judge denies certification. Id. at 203–04.
See also WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 3911 at 369–70.
137. Martineau, supra note 3, at 740.
138. For a useful overview of the convening of the Committee, its report, and its implementation
by Congress, see Martineau, supra note 3, at 718–26.
139. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMITTEE 95–96 (April 2, 1990) [hereinafter FCSC REPORT].
140. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 315, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990),
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2072(c) (2018)).
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§ 1292.141 To date, only one such rule had been promulgated. Rule 23(f)
was added to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1998, and it provides
that the courts of appeals in their discretion can hear an immediate appeal
from a class certification decision.
The confluence of the focal points of this Article—§ 1292(b), the
collateral order doctrine, and the 1990 and 1992 Acts—was addressed by
the Supreme Court in 2009 in Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter.142
There the Court, in an opinion by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, held that a
district court ruling overruling a defendant’s objection to discovery, based
on the attorney-client privilege, was not immediately appealable under the
collateral order doctrine.143 In the part of the opinion discussing the
“effectively unreviewable” prong of the doctrine, the Court drew on what
it considered the significance of § 1292(b) and the recent Congressional
legislation. Regarding the former, the Court argued that a reason for not
creating another exception under the doctrine was the existence of several
existing “appellate options,”144 including § 1292(b), writs of mandamus,
and an appeal by a party held in contempt for defying a discovery order.145
Briefly commenting on the § 1292(b), it suggested that the criteria “are
most likely to be satisfied when a privilege ruling involves a new legal
question or is of special consequence, and district courts should not
hesitate to certify an interlocutory appeal in such cases.”146 The possibility
of at least “some” discovery rulings involving the attorney-client privilege
being immediately appealable under § 1292(b), and the other exceptions,
the Court added, ameliorate hardships to affected parties and suggests that
the “institutional costs” of making all such orders immediately appeal are
not justified.147
The Court also referenced the 1990 and 1992 statutes. Its frequent
statements in collateral order doctrine cases that the doctrine should be
construed narrowly “has acquired special force in recent years,” the Court
stated, “with the enactment of legislation designating rulemaking, ‘not
expansion by court decision,’ as the preferred means for determining
whether and when prejudgment orders should be immediately
appealable.”148 The Court concluded that “[w]e expect that the
141. Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 101, 106 Stat. 45006
(1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) (2018)).
142. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100 (2009).
143. Id. at 103.
144. Id. at 110.
145. Id. at 110–13.
146. Id. at 111.
147. Id. at 112.
148. Id. at 113 (quoting Swint v. Chambers Cty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 48 (1995)).
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combination of standard post judgment appeals [and] § 1292(b) . . . will
continue to provide adequate protection to litigants ordered to disclose
materials . . . . Any further avenue for immediate appeal of such rulings
should be furnished, it at all, through rulemaking, with the opportunity for
full airing it provides.”149
Justice Clarence Thomas reiterated some of these points in his
concurring opinion. He was highly critical of the Cohen line of cases,
observing that the Court has long narrowed the scope of the doctrine,
“principally by raising the bar on what types of interests are ‘important
enough’ to justify collateral order appeals.”150 But, he added, these
“attempts to contain the Cohen doctrine have not all been successful or
persuasive.”151 A better approach, he argued, to the “case-by-case
adjudication” required by the doctrine is to leave the “value judgments”
about the “likely’ costs and benefits of allowing an exception to the final
judgment rule in an entire ‘class of cases’” to the rulemaking process.152
“And in so doing,” he would “take this opportunity to limit . . . the
doctrine that, with a sweep of the Court’s pen, subordinated what the
appellate jurisdiction statute says to what the Court thinks is a good
idea.”153
C.

The Collateral Order Doctrine, Circa 2020

To what extent can the existence of § 1292(b), and other exceptions,
bolstered by the 1990 and 1992 statutes, can be said to spell the demise of
the collateral order doctrine? Earlier collateral order doctrine cases, in
holding that the doctrine was not satisfied, had mentioned the apparent
influence of the recent legislation,154 but it first received extended
discussion in Mohawk.155 Nonetheless, much like § 1292(b) has not been
(and should not be) interpreted as spelling the end of the doctrine, the two
recent statutes should not be interpreted as, by themselves, overruling that
line of cases. Neither the Court nor Justice Thomas in Mohawk explicitly
149. Id. at 114.
150. Id. at 117 (Thomas, J., concurring).
151. Id. He agreed with the Court’s comments about alternative avenues of appeal, but
wondered, “why such avenues were not also adequate to address the orders whose unusual importance
or particularly injurious nature we have held justified immediate appeal under Cohen.” Id. at 118
(emphasis in original).
152. Id. at 118.
153. Id. at 119.
154. Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198, 210 (1999) (Thomas, J.); Swint v.
Chambers Cty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 48 (1995).
155. For post-Mohawk endorsement of rulemaking in light of the 1990 and 1992 legislation, see
Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 1702, 1714 (2017).
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so stated. At most, those opinions can be read as suggesting that the Court
should no longer hold, under the Cohen criteria, that there can be further
exceptions to the final judgment rule. Or, to put it less strongly, that such
holdings are not forbidden but that there should be an even stronger
presumption than there already is against such holdings.156
These more modest readings are consistent with the legislative
history of the laws. Granted, the Federal Courts Study Committee Report
appears to make only the briefest mention of the collateral order
doctrine,157 and apart from that the legislative history of the Congressional
legislation is rather thin.158 That said, the legislative history is best read as
permitting the Court, via the rulemaking process, to expand the number
of exceptions to the final judgement rule.159 This reading is also consistent
with the promulgation of Rule 23(f), which is widely recognized as
responding to and to a degree limiting the effect of Coopers & Lybrand,
since the rule permits discretionary appeal of class action certification
decisions where the decision permitted none.160 Were the Court, under the
purported authority of the 1990 and 1992 Acts, to simply overrule Cohen
and its progeny creating exceptions, it would not be expanding them.161
Even if the Court disclaims a new mandate to explicitly overrule the
collateral order doctrine, for decades it has openly and unapologetically
applied the doctrine in narrow manner. In light of Mohawk and other
cases, that tendency does not appear to be in danger of ending.162
156. Yet another way to manage the doctrine would be to leave intact the decisions finding the
doctrine satisfied prior to the passage of the 1990 and 1992 Acts, while explicitly or implicitly not
finding any more exceptions after the passage of those two laws. In effect that is what the Court seems
to be doing. A variation on that point (suggested to me by Bryan Lammon) would be to not overrule
or limit decisions until and if there has been rulemaking on point. It is also worth reiterating that
§ 1292(b) by its terms only applies to civil cases, so it should have less gravitational effect on the use
of the collateral order doctrine in criminal cases.
157. FCSC REPORT, supra note 139, at 95.
158. Martineau, supra note 3, at 726.
159. FCSC REPORT, supra note 139, at 96; Martineau, supra note 3, at 772; Michael E. Harriss,
Note, Rebutting the Roberts Court: Reinventing the Collateral Order Doctrine Through JudicialDecision Making, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 721, 735–37 (2014).
160. Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 1702, 1709 (2017); Solimine & Hines, supra note
117, at 1568.
161. Even under this reading, though, there could be disputes whether a particular rule
“expands” or “contracts” an existing exception. Thus, I have suggested that Mitchell v. Forsyth could
be replaced by rulemaking that, among other things, vests discretion in the court of appeals to hear
immediate appeals of denials of the qualified immunity defense. Solimine, supra note 126, at 183.
Mitchell, as currently applied, automatically permits all such appeals, at least those that don’t raise
disputed issues of fact. Id. at 174. This would arguably “contract” the Mitchell exception in a literal
sense, but leave it intact in a more nuanced way.
162. Recently the Court had two opportunities to revisit the collateral order doctrine, and
possibly revisit some of the issues posed in the text. Salt River Project Agric. Imp. & Power Dist. v.
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Continued application by the Court, and by the lower courts, of § 1292(b)
where appropriate will likely only reinforce that trend.
Two other factors are likely to continue the withering of the collateral
order doctrine. The Court has frequently cited the possibility of § 1292(b)
appeals when holding the doctrine does not apply to a particular order.
The point can be extended to those decisions holding that a particular
order does fall under the collateral order doctrine. For example, at least
some appeals of denials of the qualified immunity defense could and
should be certified under § 1292(b).163 The qualified immunity defense
also is an example of how the doctrine might be further narrowed without
complete overruling. I have earlier suggested that the Court could
plausibly limit collateral order appeals to those involving high-ranking
federal officers, which was the case in Mitchell v. Forsyth itself.164 The
vast majority of such appeals, involving lower level state officials, could
be replaced by the potential availability of the § 1292(b) and writ of
mandamus safety valves.
A second factor portending continued desuetude for the doctrine is
the venerable concern with federal court caseloads. It is interesting to
observe that in the year after Cohen was decided, circuit judges were
deciding on average about 73 appeals each year, but that number had risen
to 329 by 2014.165 This steep increase occurred despite the increase in the
Tesla Energy Operations, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 1323 (2018), involved whether the doctrine covered a denial
of the state-action defense in an antitrust suit. The Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split on
the issue, but certiorari was then dismissed after the parties settled the case. Id. In Whole Woman’s
Health v. Texas Catholic Conference of Bishops, 139 S. Ct. 1170 (2019), the Court was asked to
consider a Fifth Circuit decision, Whole Woman’s Health v. Smith, 896 F.3d 362 (5th Cir. 2018),
which 2-1 held that the doctrine was satisfied when a third-party subject of discovery raised objections
under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, which had been denied by the district court. The
Supreme Court, without recorded dissent, denied certiorari and thus passed on an opportunity to
further restrict the doctrine. Whole Women’s Health, 139 S. Ct. at 1170. The refusal to grant the appeal
was arguably surprising, since the lower court decision, while purporting to distinguish Mohawk, like
that case concerned discovery orders and potentially created a robust source of interlocutory appeals.
I was a signatory in both cases to amicus curiae briefs of law professors which argued that an
exception under the collateral order doctrine should not be found. See Brief of Federal Courts Scholars
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Salt River, 138 S. Ct. at 1323 (2018) (No. 17-368); Brief
of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Whole Woman’s Health, 139 S. Ct. at
1170 (2019) (No. 18-622) [hereinafter Whole Woman’s Health Amicus Brief]. My comments in this
footnote and in the rest of this Article are my own and do not necessarily reflect any views of other
signatories to these briefs.
163. Solimine, supra note 126, at 180–81. Indeed, Mitchell v. Forsyth should have been a good
candidate for use of § 1292(b), given the uncertainties at the time of the personal liabilities of the U.S.
Attorney General. Id. at 181 n.94.
164. Id. at 177.
165. Whole Woman’s Health Amicus Brief, supra note 162, at 20 (citing Marin K. Levy,
Judging Justice on Appeal, 123 YALE L.J. 2386, 2388 (2014) (book review)). For further discussion
of the long-term concerns with and responses to increasing caseloads in the federal appellate courts,
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number of appellate judges for each circuit. Surely it has had, and will
continue to have, an implicit impact on appeals to the Supreme Court
which call on it to increase the work of the circuit courts, and indirectly
its own.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has both a descriptive and normative component. On the
former, it has addressed with data the use of § 1292(b) appeals at both the
district and appellate circuit levels; how § 1292(b) jurisprudentially
interacts with, and how it has led (along with other factors) to the
narrowing, of the collateral order doctrine. On the latter, it has argued that
§ 1292(b) should be broadly interpreted, and that, on the whole, it has
been interpreted in a broader fashion by both high-profile, and more
conventional, recent decisions. Conversely, the collateral order doctrine
is subject to several infirmities, not least of which is that it is a “blunt
instrument,” subjecting entire categories of trial court orders to automatic
interlocutory appeals. Instead, the more nuanced appeals under § 1292(b),
or perhaps under new rule-making by the Supreme Court, are more
appropriate vehicles for allowing interlocutory appeals, since unlike the
collateral order doctrine, they permit more surgical precision in weighing
the pros (avoiding hardship) and cons (disrupting the ordinary litigation
process at the trial level) of interlocutory appeals in individual cases. In
this way, I suggest, the federal courts can avoid the venerable “Serbonian
bogs”166 or the “crazy quilt”167 that has long characterized by many
observers the present regime of interlocutory appeals in the federal courts.

see WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE UNITED STATES
COURTS OF APPEALS IN CRISIS (2013). See generally Peter S. Menell & Ryan Vacca, Revisiting and
Confronting the Federal Judiciary Capacity “Crisis”: Charting a Path for Federal Judiciary Reform,
108 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (on file with author).
166. See Anderson, supra note 111.
167. See Nagle, supra note 93. See also Steinman, supra note 26, at 1238–39 (canvassing
pejorative descriptions for interlocutory appeal doctrine).
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APPENDIX
Section 1292(b) Appeals Decided on the Merits, by Circuit, 2015–2019
CIRCUIT

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

DC
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

1
1
5
14
8
12
9
11
4
22
6
12

1
3
6
12
9
10
13
3
5
18
6
5

1
1
8
7
7
4
6
13
7
22
1
7

2
2
27
10
7
14
11
5
0
14
7
7

2
4
10
8
5
5
11
9
3
12
4
7

TOTAL

105

91

84

106

80

Source: Administrative Office of the United States Courts, see supra notes
29–30.

